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Conflict of laws in Europe was long viewed by outsiders as formalist, antiquated, and 
uninteresting.  Now that the European Union has become more active in the field, things are 
changing, but most view these changes as a mere gradual evolution.  This is untrue.  Actually, 
and fascinatingly, we are observing a real European conflicts revolution—in importance, 
radicalness, and irreversibility comparable to the twentieth-century American conflicts revolution. 
European developments go beyond the federalization of choice-of-law rules in EU 
regulations.  In addition, EU choice of law is being constitutionalized, in particular through the 
principles of mutual recognition and the country-of-origin principle, along with the influence 
from nondiscrimination, EU citizenship, and EU fundamental rights.  Together, these 
developments create a methodological pluralization that leads to a bifurcation of intra-
Community and external conflicts and to a conflict between two methods, one developed on the 
basis of classical choice of law, the other based on specific EU-law reasoning. 
These developments constitute a genuine choice-of-law revolution.  Classical European 
choice of law was characterized by three principles: privatization, nationalization, and domestic 
internationalism.  These are replaced by three new principles:  regulation, Europeanization, and 
mediatization.  This revolution is different from that in the United States, but it nonetheless holds 
important lessons. 
In the course of the argument, this Article introduces the other contributions to this issue.  
These articles were first delivered at a Symposium, jointly organized by the Duke Law Center 
for International and Comparative Law and the Tulane Law Review, and titled “The New 
European Choice-of-Law Revolution—Lessons for the United States?” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 “The New European Choice-of-Law Revolution—Lessons for 
the United States?”  The title of this Symposium, convened in 
collaboration between the Tulane Law Review and the Duke Law 
Center for International and Comparative Law on February 9, 2008, 
presents a provocation for Europeans and Americans alike:  Europeans 
do not believe in conflicts revolutions and Americans rarely believe 
they can learn from Europe.  But the provocation also serves as the 
thesis of this Article.  What we are observing in Europe is nothing less 
than a revolution. Americans will be probably unwilling and certainly 
unable to copy it entirely into their system.  But the European 
developments provide ample material for inspiration. 
 Few consider the growing influence of EU law on choice of law 
to be a revolution.1  For many, Community law appears to be of only 
                                                 
 1. Cf., e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Revolution and the European 
Evolution in Choice of Law:  Reciprocal Lessons, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1741, 1743 (“[T]he use of 
the term revolution is less appropriate for describing the European developments [in choice 
of law] than the American movement . . . .”).  But see Fausto Pocar, La comunitarizzazione 
del diritto internazionale privato:  una “European Conflict of Laws Revolution”?, 36 RIVISTA 
DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE [RIV. DIR. INT. PRIV. PROC.] 873, 883-84 
(2000) (Italy); Johan Meeusen, Instrumentalisation of Private International Law in the 
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tangential importance.  Yet a comparative analysis suggests that Europe 
is undergoing a real conflicts revolution—in importance, radicalness 
and irreversibility comparable to the twentieth-century American 
conflicts revolution.  Federalization, constitutionalization, and pluralization 
of European choice of law succeed where reform proposals in the 
1970s failed:  They bring about a genuine paradigm change. 
 The designation as revolution does not imply an evaluation.  A 
revolution may be good or bad—or, as is usually the case, good for 
some and bad for others.  It may be progressive or regressive—
counterrevolutions are revolutions, too.  It may begin brutally, with the 
storming of the Bastille, or it may be realized only gradually, like the 
Russian October Revolution, which initially did not stop trams from 
running and people from visiting the opera.  It may reverse results or 
only reasoning.  In any event, a revolution results in the irreversible 
loss of the old.  That this is likely for European choice of law will be 
shown here.  Comparison with the United States makes it clear not 
only that we are observing a real revolution in Europe, but also how 
much this European revolution differs from the American one. 
 The Article is structured as follows.  Part II develops the concept 
of a conflicts revolution on the archetype of the U.S. conflicts 
revolution of the twentieth century and relates this to European 
developments in the nineteenth century.  Those developments 
constituted a movement that defined three foundational principles of 
classical contemporary European choice of law:  privatization, 
nationalization, and domestic internationalism.  Part III analyzes in 
more depth three revolutionary developments of European choice of 
law.  The first development is federalization of choice of law, by way 
of European codification.  The second development is constitutionali-
zation, in particular through the principles of mutual recognition and 
the country-of-origin principle, and through the influence from 
nondiscrimination, EU citizenship, and EU fundamental rights.  The 
third development is methodological pluralization, which leads to a 
bifurcation of intra-Community and external conflicts and to a conflict 
between two methods, one developed on the basis of classical choice 
of law, the other based on specific EU law reasoning.  Part IV demon-
strates, first, why these developments constitute a genuine choice-of-
law revolution.  The classical principles of privatization, nationaliza-
tion, and domestic internationalism are replaced by three new 
                                                                                                             
European Union:  Towards a European Conflicts Revolution?, 9 EUR. J. MIGRATION & LAW 
287, 290-91 (2007); Symeon C. Symeonides, Rome II and Tort Conflicts:  A Missed 
Opportunity, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 173, 174 (2008). 
 
 
 
 
1610 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1607 
 
principles:  regulation, Europeanization, and mediatization.  Part IV.B 
suggests that this revolution, although different from that in the United 
States, nonetheless holds important lessons.  The individual articles in 
this Symposium issue are introduced in the course of this argument. 
II. REVOLUTIONS IN CHOICE OF LAW 
A. The American Conflicts Revolution as Archetype 
 The model for each conflicts revolution2 is the U.S. conflicts 
revolution.  Its story is well known, at least in its main features—its 
early forerunners in the 1930s with academic critique against the 
formalism of the First Restatement, its escalation to a highpoint in the 
1960s with important court decisions and sometimes radical academic 
reconceptualizations of the field, its subsequent decline when some of 
its achievements were adopted and others replaced, and the current 
widespread disillusionment.  This sequence of events—reform, 
radicalization, restoration—is not atypical for revolutions.  Nor is the 
fact that resulting practical outcomes have not changed much.3  What 
the revolution has changed is not so much the outcomes of cases but 
the way in which we in the United States think about choice of law.  
Revolutions are, first and foremost, paradigm changes, reactions 
against old paradigms.4  The Copernican Revolution succeeded over 
the Ptolemaian world view not because the latter created inaccurate 
results but because it required an ever more complicated system of 
epicycles.  Similarly, the old U.S. choice-of-law paradigm yielded 
workable results, but the path to these results was too complicated and 
left too little space for those considerations considered actually 
relevant.  The role of epicycles was played by the so-called “escape 
devices”—characterization, the substance/procedure distinction, 
renvoi, and the public policy exceptions. 
 Formalism and “escape devices” existed in Europe, too. 
Nonetheless, the Europeans remained largely critical, both toward 
                                                 
 2. On the Canadian “conflicts revolution” (which differs significantly from the 
American one), see generally Peter Kincaid, Jensen v. Tolofson and the Revolution in Tort 
Choice of Law, 74 CAN. BAR REV. 537 (1995); William A. Tetley, The On-Going Saga of 
Canada’s Conflict of Law Revolution—Theory and Practice (pt. 1), 24 PRAXIS DES 
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS [IPRAX] 457 (2004) (F.R.G.). 
 3. For a vivid characterization, see Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws:  A 
Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 44 (1984) (“The mountains labored 
mightily only to give birth to a mouse.”). 
 4. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 92 (2d ed. 1970). 
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American revolutions5 and toward the European reform proposals they 
inspired.6  Adaptation and evolution were preferred over real 
revolution.7  The reasons are manifold.  Because European nations are 
older and more homogenous than U.S. states, they may have a greater 
desire for stability and their courts may be less prone to legal change 
than their U.S. counterparts.8  In the United States, choice of law 
largely concerns interstate conflicts between legal systems whose 
common laws are structurally quite similar but often differ 
significantly in their policies; choice of law in Europe deals with legal 
orders that differ more in doctrine and system than in their policies.9 
 Yet the most important reason is the very nature of revolutions.  
Revolutions are defined less by what they aim for and more by what 
they tear down, less by what they are for and more by what they are 
against.  Revolutions are always reactions against the status quo.  
When Brainerd Currie wrote that “[a]lmost all constructive writing on 
conflict of laws in this century has been in revolt against this 
‘heritage,’”10 by “constructive writing” he meant writing in the United 
States, and by “heritage” he meant the formalism of the American 
vested rights theory as established by Joseph Beale and as codified in 
the Restatement of Conflict of Laws in 1934. 
                                                 
 5. See, e.g., Gerhard Kegel, Paternal Home and Dream Home:  Traditional Conflict 
of Laws and the American Reformers, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 615, 633 (1979). 
 6. For an overview, see generally Erik Jayme, The American Conflicts Revolution 
and the Impact on European Private International Law, in FORTY YEARS ON:  THE EVOLUTION 
OF POSTWAR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE 15, 15-27 (1990); Frank Vischer, New 
Developments in European Conflict of Laws and the Influence of the U.S. Doctrine—A Short 
Survey, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD:  ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON 
MEHREN 459 (James A.R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002) [hereinafter LAW 
AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD]. 
 7. See generally Kurt Siehr, Revolution and Evolution in Conflicts Law, 60 LA. L. 
REV. 1353 (2000) (discussing the pragmatic development of European conflicts law).  For the 
common law developments, see generally Peter M. North, Reform But Not Revolution:  
General Course on Private International Law, in 220 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 
RECUEIL DES COURS:  COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY  OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
9 (1990). 
 8. MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE:  A GUIDE THROUGH 
THE JUNGLE 12-13 (1995); Vischer, supra note 6, at 460. 
 9. Ralf Michaels, American Law (United States), in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 66, 70 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006); see Mathias Reimann, Domestic and 
International Conflicts Law in the United States and Western Europe, in INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICT OF LAWS FOR THE THIRD MILLENNIUM—ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FRIEDRICH K. 
JUENGER 109, 113 (Patrick Borchers & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS]. 
 10. BRAINERD CURRIE, The Verdict of Quiescent Years, in BRAINERD CURRIE, 
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 584, 613 (1963). 
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 This was not Europe’s heritage.  Of course, there are superficial 
similarities between the First Restatement and classical European 
choice of law.  Both prefer rules over principles.  Both are jurisdiction-
selecting instead of rule-selecting.  Both determine the applicable law 
on the basis of a connecting factor, without regard to the substance of 
or the policies behind the law so determined.  Both favor predictability 
and uniformity of outcomes over substantive justice in the individual 
case.  Finally, as already mentioned, European choice of law makes 
ample use of the same escape devices as the traditional method in the 
United States.11 
 But the similarity is superficial.12  Traditional European choice of 
law is paradigmatically different from the First Restatement.  The 
vested-rights theory, the main target for the American Revolution, 
never took strong hold in Europe:  Wächter and Savigny had refuted it 
in Germany in the 1840s before it could become prominent; a later 
approach by Antoine Pillet remained largely irrelevant.13  When the 
American conflicts revolution set in, European choice of law had its 
revolution already behind it. 
B. The European Conflicts Revolution of the Nineteenth Century 
 This European conflicts revolution occurred in the nineteenth, not 
in the twentieth century.  What Paul Neuhaus called a “Copernican 
turn” of choice of law was a genuine Copernican revolution, a 
paradigm shift in the way here described, which leaves the objects 
unaltered but defines our perspective on these objectives in a 
fundamentally new way.14  The wealth of opinions in nineteenth-
                                                 
 11. Cf. Jacob Dolinger, In Defense of the “General Part” Principles, in 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 9, at 23, 24 (commenting that in Europe, 
“escape clauses . . . carefully manipulate the method of choice of law”); Kurt Siehr, General 
Problems of Private International Law in Modern Codifications—De Lege Lata and De Lege 
Europea Ferenda, 2005 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 17, 26-29 (summarizing the recent development 
of escape clauses in Europe). 
 12. Bernard Audit, A Continental Lawyer Looks at American Choice-of-Law 
Principles, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 589, 590-98 (1979). 
 13. See Ralf Michaels, EU Law as Private International Law?  Reconceptualising the 
Country-of-Origin Principle as Vested-Rights Theory, 2 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 195, 216-20, 226-
27 (2006). 
 14. Paul Neuhaus, Savigny und die Rechtsfindung aus der Natur der Sache, 15 
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 
364, 366 (1949-1950) (F.R.G.).  For a discussion in English, see Kahn-Freund, General 
Problems of Private International Law, in 143 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL 
DES COURS:  COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 139, 244 
(1974).  Savignyan choice of law is discussed as paradigm in the sense used by KUHN, supra 
note 4, by Julio D. Gonzáles Campos, Diversification, spécialisation, flexibilisation et 
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century Europe is no smaller than that of twentieth-century America.  
Carl Georg Wächter developed a local law theory that predated and 
possibly influenced those of Cook and Ehrenzweig.15  Heinrich Thöl 
discussed whether principles should be preferred over rules and 
developed, long before Currie, a kind of governmental interest 
analysis, under which the scope of statutes was determined by their 
interpretation, and forum law would yield to foreign law only if the 
forum had no interest.16  This idea was confronted with the criticism, 
well known from the American debate,17 that the lawmaker usually 
does not think about the territorial scope of his rules.18 
 The most important developments in the nineteenth century, 
however, that led to the foundation of the traditional European conflict 
of laws, differed from those in twentieth-century United States.  They 
can be described under three key concepts—privatization, nationaliza-
tion, and domestic internationalism. 
 The first element—privatization—can be found in the work of 
Savigny.19  By shifting the focus of choice of law away from the statute 
and its focus on the legal relation and its seat, he changed not so much 
the results, but the perspective.  In particular, he so achieved a 
privatized understanding of choice of law that was different from both 
older European approaches and from those by Joseph Story, whom he 
otherwise often followed.20  Story had viewed private international law 
as an international law for private matters; Savigny established it as a 
                                                                                                             
matérialisation des règles de droit international privé (Cours général), in 287 ACADÉMIE DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS:  COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 30-34 (2000).  The idea of a paradigm is often invoked by critics.  See, 
e.g., H.U. JESSURUN D’OLIVEIRA, DE RUÏNE VAN EEN PARADIGMA:  DE KONFLIKTREGEL (1976); 
Rudolf Wiethölter, Begriffs- oder Interessenjurisprudenz—falsche Fronten im IPR und 
Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht, in INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT UND RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 
IM AUSGANG DES 20 JAHRHUNDERTS:  FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GERHARD KEGEL 213, 222-24, 256-60 
(Alexander Lüderitz & Jochen Schröder eds., 1977). 
 15. For the influence on Ehrenzweig, see K. Lipstein, The General Principles of 
Private International Law, in 135 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS:  
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 144-47 (1972) 
(“Ehrenzweig—Wächter redivivus”). 
 16. HEINRICH THÖL, EINLEITUNG IN DAS DEUTSCHE PRIVATRECHT 170-71, 175-76 
(Göttingen, 1851). 
 17. E.g., Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 
MICH. L. REV. 392, 392-93 (1980). 
 18. CARL FRIEDRICH VON GERBER, SYSTEM DES DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 728 n.5 
(6th ed. 1858). 
 19. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Wm. 
Guthrie transl., 1868). 
 20. See Gerhard Kegel, Story and Savigny, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 39 (1989); Ralf 
Michaels, Public and Private International Law:  German Views on Global Issues, 4 J. 
PRIVATE INT’L L. 121, 126-28 (2008). 
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private law for international connections.21  Story’s conflict of laws was 
a system of competences, resembling jurisdiction and the recognition 
of foreign judgments. Savigny’s was a system of references, separating 
the applicable law from jurisdiction and the application of foreign law 
from the recognition of foreign judgments.  Comity was no longer, as 
it had been for Story, a concept of public international law and 
international relations; it became a concept of a global civil 
community.22  Territoriality was no longer an expression of territorial 
sovereignty but a means to determine the closest connection, the “seat” 
of a legal relation.  The legal relation predated its regulation by the 
state—other than jurisdiction for Story, and also other than Beale’s 
vested right, which was conferred by a state.  Private law was detached 
from specific regulatory interests by states (though not from the state 
at large)23 so “public” common interests, which of course were 
important in nineteenth-century private law too,24 could be taken into 
account in a specific private-law manner.  This made it possible to 
formulate abstract and universal rules of reference that determined the 
applicability of foreign law without giving it extraterritorial validity. 
 The second element—nationalization—is linked with the name 
of Mancini.25  Mancini adopted many of Savigny’s postulates, but not 
his depoliticized vision of private international law.  For Mancini (like 
for the authors of the French Civil Code before him)26 the most 
important connecting factor in choice of law was membership in a 
political community (the nation) as realized in a principle of 
nationality.  Territoriality was restricted to those areas of the law that 
implicate public policy.  This foundation of choice of law in 
                                                 
 21. Michaels, supra note 20, at 127. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See Ralf Michaels, Globalizing Savigny?  The State in Savigny’s Private 
International Law and the Challenge from Europeanization and Globalization, in AKTUELLE 
FRAGEN ZU POLITISCHER UND RECHTLICHER STEUERUNG IM KONTEXT DER GLOBALISIERUNG 
119, 128-30 (Michael Stolleis & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 2007). 
 24. Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, Private Law and the State—Comparative 
Perceptions and Historical Observations, 71 RABELSZ 345, 351, 380 (2007); cf. Hans-Peter 
Haferkamp, The Science of Private Law and the State in 19th Century Germany, 56 AM. J. 
COMP. L. (forthcoming 2008). 
 25. See CHRISTIAN VON BAR & PETER MANKOWSKI, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 
517-21 (2d ed. 2003).  On nationalization as the defining characteristic of nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century choice of law, see JEAN-LOUIS HALPÉRIN, ENTRE NATIONALISME JURIDIQUE 
ET COMMUNAUTÉ DE DROIT 67-85 (1999); JAN KROPHOLLER, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 
14-15 (6th ed. 2006); ERIK JAYME, PASQUALE STANISLAO MANCINI—INTERNATIONALES 
PRIVATRECHT ZWISCHEN RISORGIMENTO UND PRAKTISCHER JURISPRUDENZ (1980); Kurt H. 
Nadelmann, Mancini’s Nationality Rule and Non-Unified Legal Systems:  Nationality Versus 
Domicile, 17 AM. J. COMP. L. 418 (1969). 
 26. HALPÉRIN, supra note 25, at 24-26. 
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community membership and the preference of community affiliation 
over territoriality may appear, at first sight, similar to interest analysis 
as established by Currie, which also widely prioritizes community 
affiliation (as expressed in domicile) over territoriality.  But an 
important difference exists:  Whereas Currie focuses on domicile in 
order to determine the regulatory interests of governments, Mancini 
prioritizes nationality over domicile because it expresses the 
individual’s membership in the community (the nation) itself. 
 Finally, the third element of the nineteenth-century European 
conflicts paradigm is domestic internationalism. Broadly, for Savigny, 
choice-of-law rules were based on reason; for Mancini, they were 
based on (public) international law.  In either case, they were distinct 
from domestic law and thus not in need of legislative regulation 
(though both acknowledged existing state rules).  The counter-idea, 
that choice of law is not universal but based in each state’s law, shapes 
the American understanding, where choice of law stands in close 
proximity to the state’s substantive law and the underlying interests.  
For a long time, this dichotomy of universalism and particularism 
shaped debates in choice of law.  The prevailing view in Europe today 
combines both approaches:  rules of choice of law are rules of 
domestic law and thus open to legislative discretion, but they are 
strictly different from domestic substantive law rules,27 and their focus 
is international.  Accordingly, the considerations going into choice-of-
law rules are not firmly connected with those of substantive law nor 
those of public international law, a position sometimes described as the 
“third school of private international law” (besides the internationalist 
and nationalist approaches).28  The most important connecting factors 
are nationality and territoriality; yet because choice of law does not 
merely enforce sovereignty interests, it is not confined to this 
dichotomy and instead uses further connecting factors.  In U.S. law, an 
occasional consequence from this distinction between substantive law 
and conflict of laws is the characterization of choice-of-law rules as 
procedural rules and the procedural resolution of conflict-of-laws 
                                                 
 27. GERHARD KEGEL & KLAUS SCHURIG, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 52-58 (9th 
ed. 2004); KLAUS SCHURIG, KOLLISIONSNORM UND SACHRECHT:  ZU STRUKTUR, STANDORT 
UND METHODE DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT (1981). 
 28. Konrad Zweigert, Die dritte Schule im internationalen Privatrecht.  Zur neueren 
Wissenschaftsgeschichte des Kollisionsrechts, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR LEO RAAPE 35, 43, 49 
(1948); cf. Kurt Lipstein, Private International Law with a Social Content—A Super Law?, in 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KONRAD ZWEIGERT ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG 179, 179 (Herbert Bernstein et al. 
eds., 1981) (noting Zweigert’s use of the phrase). 
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problems by reference to the law of pleading.29  In continental 
European law, by contrast, choice-of-law rules are quite clearly neither 
substantive nor procedural law but represent a third category of rules.30  
Conflict of laws is domestic in its foundation, international in its focus.  
The regulation of conflicts problems is decentralized in the sense that 
every state has its own rules.  But uniformity is a goal, and the way 
toward it leads first to bilateral choice-of-law rules and finally to 
unification by treaty. 
 These three principles—privatization, nationalization, domestic 
nationalism—provided the pillars of European choice of law until 
today.  The European paradigm proved more flexible than the First 
Restatement in the United States and was therefore capable of 
integrating many of the American innovations in a broadened system 
of conflicts interests.31  Substantive interests could be accounted for 
through special types of choice-of-law rules protecting weaker parties 
or recognizing specific regulatory interests, which the American 
theory of vested rights did not allow.  Institutions of the “general part,” 
which figured in the United States as “escape devices” inconsistent 
with the logic of the vested-rights theory, constituted the cornerstone 
of European choice of law.  Application of the law of the common 
domicile to car accidents, which became crucial for the American 
conflicts revolution with the decision in Babcock v. Jackson,32 could be 
reached effortlessly through special choice-of-law rules without the 
need of a revolution.33 
III. EUROPEANIZATION 
 Europeanization, thus the thesis of this Article, is not so easy to 
integrate into classical choice of law as the American reforms of the 
twentieth century because the political background is shifting.  Such 
political changes have triggered each paradigmatic shift in European 
conflicts thinking up until today.  In the thirteenth century, the rise of 
city states led to conflicts between local statutes as islands within the 
sea of the ius commune; the reaction was the development of a conflict 
of laws based on this very ius commune.  In the seventeenth century, 
                                                 
 29. Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 324-29 
(1990); Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law:  Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 2448, 2472 (1999). 
 30. KROPHOLLER, supra note 25, 103-04. 
 31. KEGEL & SCHURIG, supra note 27, at 128-58; KROPHOLLER, supra note 25, at 31-
36.  For comparison with governmental interest analysis, see Kegel, supra note 5, at 621-25. 
 32. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). 
 33. For a comparative overview, see Siehr, supra note 7, at 1354-59. 
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the ius commune was declining and the sovereign state was rising, so 
conflicts now existed between states; the comity doctrine reacted by 
founding choice of law in international relations.  The nineteenth 
century saw the rise of the private bourgeois society in partial 
opposition to the state and the nation as fundament of the nation state; 
the reactions were privatization and nationalization of choice of law.  
The strengthened social-interventionist state in the twentieth century, 
which spurred the conflicts revolution in the United States, could be 
integrated in Europe without a revolution, because conflict of laws was 
already understood as domestic. 
 Now that this system of independent nation states is merging into 
the European Union, conflict of laws is changing as well.  Although 
choice of law has long been a matter of some concern for the 
European Union34 its influence was, for a long time, minimal.  Only 
now that choice of law is widely Europeanized and thereby renewed 
has a real conflicts revolution been created.  One might expect this new 
European conflict of laws to approximate the U.S. conflicts revolution 
because the European Union as a quasi-federal organization has quite 
similar conflicts to resolve as the federal system of the United States.35  
To some extent this is the case, as the comparison shows.  But because 
the European paradigm against which the European revolution is 
directed differs from the theory of vested rights, as demonstrated 
earlier, the revolution looks different as well.  Three relevant aspects 
are visible in Europe that are largely absent in the United States:  
federalization, constitutionalization, and pluralization.  They overcome 
the three central elements of classical European choice of law:  
privatization, nationalization, and domestic internationalism. 
A. Federalization 
 That the national character of choice of law is being overcome is 
most obvious in federal regulation, which withdraws control of 
conflicts of laws from states and instead centralizes it.  Such federal 
legislative regulation has often been suggested in the United States, 
especially by reformers and revolutionaries eager to constrict and 
                                                 
 34. See Ulrich Drobnig, Conflict of Laws and the European Community, 15 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 204 (1967); René Savatier, Le marché commun au regard du droit international 
privé, REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [REV. CRIT. DR. INT. PRIV.] 237 (1959) 
(Fr.). 
 35. See Reimann, supra note 9, at 119-21. 
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coordinate the interests of states, which had now become relevant.36  
Even Brainerd Currie deemed federal legislation desirable, at least for 
important issues.37  More recently, similar proposals have been made.38  
The practicability of such federal codification has always been 
doubted.  David Cavers warned as such in 1965, at the time adequately, 
with a comparison to the European Communities.39 
 Proposals for a Europe-wide unification of choice of law have 
existed since the 1960s; for contracts, they culminated in the Rome 
Convention of 1980.40  Although the Convention was part of the acquis 
communautaire, it was a treaty, not a Community instrument, so the 
European Court of Justice did not have a general competence for 
choice of law.41  Two special protocols to the Convention intended to 
establish such a competence did not enter into force until 2004.  As a 
consequence, the truly uniform interpretation of choice-of-law rules 
envisaged in article 18 of the Rome Convention remained, largely, an 
illusion.  Real EU choice-of-law rules were limited to provisions in 
directives determining their scope of application.42  Only when the 
                                                 
 36. Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421, 433-34 (1919); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the 
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 402 (1964); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The 
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 513 (1954); Alfred Hill, 
The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 541, 542-43 (1958); Ernest G. 
Lorenzen Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736, 751 (1924). 
 37. CURRIE, supra note 10, at 183.  For one such issue, see Paul S. Bird, Note, Mass 
Tort Litigation:  A Statutory Solution to the Choice of Law Impasse, 96 YALE L.J. 1077, 1092-
93 (1987). 
 38. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp:  The Case for Federal 
Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 1-51 (1991); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, 
From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1224-25 (2000). 
 39. DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 247 (1965); David F. Cavers, 
Legislative Choice of Law:  Some European Examples, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 340, 359 (1971). 
 40. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980 O.J. (L 266).  
The consolidated version appears at 1998 O.J. (C 27) 34.  On the legislative history, see Peter 
M. North, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980):  
Its History and Main Features, in PETER M. NORTH, ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
23, 29-34 (1993). 
 41. Teun Struycken, Private Law Contracts to Which the European Community Is a 
Party, in INTERCONTINENTAL COOPERATION THROUGH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:  ESSAYS 
IN MEMORY OF PETER E. NYGH 385, 393-94 (Talia Einhorn & Kurt Siehr eds., 2004); A.V.M. 
Struycken, Les conséquences de l’intégration européenne sur le développement du droit 
international privé, in 232 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS:  
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 257, 295, 323-24 
(1992). 
 42. PETER STONE, EU PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW—HARMONISATION OF LAWS 316-
17 (2006); Harry Duintjer Tebbens, Les règles de conflit contenues dans les instruments de 
droit dérivé, in LES CONFLITS DE LOIS ET LE SYSTÈME JURIDIQUE COMMUNAUTAIRE 101-15 
(Angelika Fuchs, Horatia Muir Watt & Étienne Pataud eds., 2004); Lajos Vékás, Der Weg zur 
Vergemeinschaftung des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts—eine Skizze, in LIBER 
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Treaty of Amsterdam granted the European Union the competence to 
regulate conflict of laws43 was it possible to codify choice-of-law rules 
for noncontractual obligations in the Rome II Regulation;44 a 
codification of rules for contractual obligations has just been adopted 
as the Rome I Regulation.45  A proposed Rome III Regulation would 
codify rules for matrimonial property regimes.46  Other proposals, or 
Green Papers, concern matrimonial matters,47 maintenance obligations,48 
and successions and wills.49 
                                                                                                             
MEMORIALIS PETAR ŠARČEVIĆ:  UNIVERSALISM, TRADITION AND THE INDIVIDUAL 171, 174-83 
(Vesna Tomljenović, Johan Erauw & Paul Volken eds., 2006) [hereinafter LIBER MEMORIALIS 
ŠARČEVIĆ]. 
 43. See PHILIPPE-EMMANUEL PARTSCH, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ EUROPÉEN:  
DE ROME À NICE (2003); Jürgen Basedow, The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws 
Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, 37 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 687, 691-92 (2000); Katharina 
Boele-Woelki & Ronald H. van Ooik, The Communitarization of Private International Law, 
2002 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 1, 3; Alegría Borrás, Le droit international privé communautaire:  
réalités, problèmes et perspectives d’avenir, in 317 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 
RECUEIL DES COURS:  COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
313, 421 (2005); Oliver Remien, European Private International Law, the European 
Community and Its Emerging Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 38 COMMON MARKET 
L. REV. 53, 57 (2001).  For criticism from England, see Andrew Dickinson, European Private 
International Law:  Embracing New Horizons or Mourning the Past?, 1 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 
197, 200-01 (2005); Richard Fentiman, Choice of Law in Europe, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2021, 
2024-27 (2008).  The United Kingdom and Denmark are not automatically bound by EU 
legislation in choice of law but maintain discretion to opt in.  The United Kingdom opted into 
the Rome II Regulation.  Regulation 864/2007, On the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations (Rome II), recital 39, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 43 [hereinafter Rome II].  
Consultations regarding opting into the Rome I Regulation are ongoing.  See MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, ROME I—SHOULD THE U.K. OPT IN? (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/ 
publications/cp0508.htm.  Denmark did not opt into the Rome II Regulation.  Rome II, supra, 
recital 40. 
 44. Rome II, supra note 43. 
 45. Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations (Rome I) (adopted June 6, 2008) [hereinafter Rome I]. 
 46. Commission Green Paper on Conflict of Laws in Matters Concerning Matrimonial 
Property Regimes, Including the Question of Jurisdiction and Mutual Recognition, COM 
(2006) 400 final (July 17, 2006).  The replies are compiled at European Comm’n, 
Contributions on the Green Paper on Conflict of Laws in Matters Concerning Matrimonial 
Property Regime, Including the Question of Jurisdiction and Mutual Recognition, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/matrimonial_property/news_contrib
utions_matrimonial_property_en.htm (last visited June 3, 2008). 
 47. Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 as 
Regards Jurisdiction and Introducing Rules Concerning Applicable Law in Matrimonial 
Matters, COM (2006) 339 final (July 17, 2006). 
 48. Proposal for a Council Regulation on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition 
and Enforcement of Decisions and Cooperation in Matters Relating to Maintenance 
Obligations, COM (2005) 649 final (Dec. 12, 2005). 
 49. Commission Green Paper on Succession and Wills, COM (2005) 65 final (Mar. 
1, 2005); European Parliament Resolution with Recommendations to the Commission on 
Succession and Wills, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6_TA(2006)0496 (2006). 
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 Most analysts do not consider this federalization as a sign of a 
revolution.  Although there have been protests, especially in France 
and England,50 discussion has been nowhere nearly as fierce as the 
parallel debate over a European private law codification.51  Formally, 
the codification overcomes the fragmentation of choice-of-law regimes 
that Gerhard Kegel called the “cancer of private international law,”52 
and that Savigny hoped to overcome through convergence.  Proponents 
of a nationalized conflict of laws in particular have advocated 
unification since Mancini, albeit through treaties; European legislation 
appears to fulfill this hope through legislation.  Substantively, not 
much appears to change.  Because European choice-of-law rules are 
typically bilateral and forum preference is disfavored,53 the European 
legislator need not change much.  Most domestic rules are therefore 
substantively quite similar to the Rome Convention; the method is, at 
first sight, similar to bilateralism.54 
 The view that federalization does not amount to a revolution is 
shared in several contributions to this issue.  Dennis Solomon, in his 
careful analysis of the new Rome I Regulation as compared to the 
previous Convention, sees a “continuation of the conventional 
                                                 
 50. In France, some forty law professors signed an open letter to President Chirac 
protesting the proposed regulation.  See L’Union européenne, la démocratie et l’État de droit:  
lettre ouverte au président de la République, reprinted in 2006 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, 
ÉDITION GÉNÉRALE, ACTUALITÉS NO. 586.  An English translation of the letter can be found at 
Comparative Law Blog, Open Letter French Private International Scholars on European 
Intrusion, http://comparativelawblog.blogspot.com/2007/01/open-letter-french-private.html 
(Jan. 17, 2007, 11:11 EDT).  Some eighty French professors signed a letter in response, 
defending the regulation against what they perceived as anti-Europeanism.  See La 
proposition de Règlement européen sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles (Rome 
I) en question, reprinted in 2007 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE – ÉDITION GÉNÉRALE, ACTUALITÉS NO. 
18.  The main author of the original open letter, Vincent Heuzé, published a counter-response 
rejecting the criticism of anti-Europeanism:  L’honneur des professeurs de droit. Explication 
d’une lettre ouverte sur l’Union européenne, la démocratie et l’État de droit, reprinted in 
2007 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, ÉDITION GÉNÉRALE, ÉTUDE NO. 116.  For commentary, see Erik 
Jayme, Frankreich:  Professorenstreit zum Europäischen IPR—einige Betrachtungen, 28 
IPRAX 188-89 (2008).  For the English protests, see Dickinson, supra note 43, at 199-200. 
 51. For an overview, see Nils Jansen, European Civil Code, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 9, at 247. 
 52. GERHARD KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 86 (6th ed. 1987) (author’s 
translation).  The sentence is no longer contained in the most recent edition of this book.  See 
KEGEL & SCHURIG, supra note 27, at 139. 
 53. KROPHOLLER, supra note 25, at 42-47. 
 54. Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières, La responsabilité civile dans la proposition de 
règlement communautaire sur la loi applicable aux obligations non contractuelles (“Rome 
II”), in LES CONFLITS DE LOIS ET LE SYSTÈME JURIDIQUE COMMUNAUTAIRE, supra note 42, at 
185, 191-92. 
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system”.55  By and large, as he shows, the rules under the final version 
resemble both those that existed in Europe and those that exist in the 
United States (with the exception that Europe provides greater 
protection to weaker parties).  Yet Solomon also addresses what he calls 
the “revolutionary advances” proposed at earlier stages of the legislative 
process that would, if enacted, have resulted in a more drastic changes:  
the abolition of an escape clause, the possibility to choose nonstate law 
like the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 
and the mandatory application of the consumer’s home law applicable 
law for consumer contracts. 
 Patrick Borchers, looking at European developments for contracts 
from the U.S. side, is also skeptical as to whether Europe is seeing a 
revolution.56  Borchers points out how similar U.S. and European 
choice-of-law rules for contracts have become in their endorsement of 
party autonomy.  He sees the most important difference in the concept 
of mandatory rules, an important element of European choice of law, 
but one hard to transplant into U.S. law, at least as can be gathered from 
the very limited success of the new section 1-301 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, which adopts the concept. 
 Jan von Hein, discussing torts, questions the notion of a European 
choice-of-law revolution, arguing that the Rome II Regulation is 
actually the product of a long-run evolution in member states’ domestic 
laws.57  As he notes, most EU member states have long applied 
Savigny’s approach to choice of law and have codified these principles 
during the twentieth century in an effort to influence EU choice of law.  
The effect of these codifications is evident in the inclusion of common 
domicile rules and the allowance of post-hoc party autonomy.  Von 
Hein concludes that Rome II is successful precisely because its rules 
have been tested in member states’ courts and analyzed by European 
academics prior to its promulgation. 
 Symeon Symeonides seconds this view in his paper, which offers 
reciprocal lessons for the United States and Europe.58  Noting that early 
U.S. choice of law was based on European principles, he also indicates 
that current U.S. solutions to choice-of-law problems remain similar to 
those of Europe, despite a purported revolution in the United States.  
Generally, Symeonides recommends that the United States seek to 
evolve its choice-of-law rules according to a long-run plan, rather than 
                                                 
 55. Dennis Solomon, The Private International Law of Contracts in Europe:  
Advances and Retreats, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1711 (2008). 
 56. Patrick Borchers, Categorical Exceptions to Party Autonomy in Private 
International Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1645 (2008). 
 57. Jan von Hein, Something Old and Something Borrowed, but Nothing New?  
Rome II and the European Choice-of-Law Evolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1663 (2008). 
 58. Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Revolution and the European Evolution 
in Choice of Law:  Reciprocal Lessons, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1741 (2008). 
 
 
 
 
1622 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1607 
 
rejecting them in a short-lived revolution.  For Europe, Symeonides 
recommends a return to issue-by-issue analysis in choice of law and an 
acknowledgement of states’ interest in the outcomes of these cases. 
 In my opinion, the view that federalization does not change much 
underestimates the decisive difference between a treaty and a 
codification.59  The European Union is competent to regulate choice of 
law only “in so far as necessary for the proper functioning of the 
internal market.”60  Although this is often read merely to suggest the 
need for uniform rules,61 this need alone would hardly justify a 
regulation over a treaty.  Treaties, however, leave the interests of 
respective nations intact.  Where national interests concur, treaties will 
perpetuate protection of these interests; where national interests differ, 
treaties can achieve compromises between these interests or, if no 
compromise is possible, leave the issue to each national state.  A 
supranational codification is not confined in this way; it can also 
decide against the interests of all states for the interest of individuals or 
a transnational community.  In this sense, its rules are neither unilateral 
nor bilateral, but distributive—it allocates regulatory competence from 
a central point.62  A supranational codification can establish neutral 
rules. But it also can (or even must, given the limited competences of 
the European Union) be based on the explicit policies of the European 
Union, the requirements of the common market.  As an EU instrument, 
it stands in connection with the substantive policies of the European 
Union and these are often opposed to those of the individual states. 
 Sometimes, such a connection to EU policies is explicit.  One 
example can be found in article 7 of Rome II (“Environmental 
damage”), which effectively gives the plaintiff a choice between the 
law of the place of conduct and that of the place of injury and justifies 
                                                 
 59. Ralf Michaels, Three Paradigms of Legal Unification:  National, International, 
Transnational, in AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 96TH ANNUAL MEETING 333, 333-
36 (2002); see also Ulrich Drobnig, Unification of National Law and the Uniformisation of 
the Rules of Private International Law, in THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
UPON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE MEMBER STATES 1, 2 (P. Bourel et al. eds., 1981).  
 60. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 65, 2006 O.J. (C 321E) 37, 68 
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
 61. Rome II, supra note 43, recital 6; Rome I, supra note 45, recital 6. 
 62. See Jürgen Basedow, Spécificité et coordination du droit international privé 
communautaire, in DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ, TRAVAUX DU COMITÉ FRANÇAIS DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE—ANNÉES 2002-2004 at 275, 283-84 (2005).  For criticism of this 
point, see BERNARD AUDIT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 50 (4th ed. 2006). 
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this with the goal to achieve a high level of environmental protection.63  
Such preferential treatment of plaintiffs is not incompatible with 
traditional choice-of-law rules.64  Nor is the integration of substantive 
policy consideration in choice of law a problem (although the focus on 
incentives is in contrast to the traditional European concept of tort as a 
law of compensation, as found explicitly mentioned in the EU 
Commission’s Rome II proposal).65  The decisive novelty is that these 
interests are found neither in domestic law nor in a common consensus 
but in the law of the European Union, in this case in environmental 
protection and the precautionary principle as listed in article 174 of the 
EU Treaty.66 
 Article 7 of Rome II is no outlier.  Provisions on consumer 
protection in Rome I are based on similar EU policy.67  The rules on 
product liability in article 5 of Rome II are based not on the mere 
                                                 
 63.  
The law applicable to a noncontractual obligation arising out of environmental 
damage or damage sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage 
shall be the law determined pursuant to Article 4(1), unless the person seeking 
compensation for damage chooses to base his or her claim on the law of the 
country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred. 
Rome II, supra note 43, art. 7. 
 64. See JAN VON HEIN, DAS GÜNSTIGKEITSPRINZIP IM INTERNATIONALEN 
DELIKTSRECHT 124-26 (1999); KROPHOLLER, supra note 25, at 525-26; Christian von Bar, 
Environmental Damage in Private International Law, in 268 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS:  COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 291, 367-75 (1999). 
 65. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law 
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (“ROME II”), at 12, COM (2003) 427 final (July 
22, 2003) (“Article 3(1), which establishes an objective link between the damage and the 
applicable law, further reflects the modern concept of the law of civil liability which is no 
longer, as it was in the first half of the last century, oriented towards punishing for fault-based 
conduct:  nowadays, it is the compensation function that dominates, as can be seen from the 
proliferation of no-fault strict liability schemes.”). 
 66. EC Treaty art. 174(2) (“Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high 
level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the 
Community.  It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that 
preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified 
at source and that the polluter should pay.”); Rome II, supra note 43, recital 25 (“Regarding 
environmental damage, Article 174 of the Treaty, which provides that there should be a high 
level of protection based on the precautionary principle and the principle that preventive 
action should be taken, the principle of priority for corrective action at source and the 
principle that the polluter pays, fully justifies the use of the principle of discriminating in 
favour of the person sustaining the damage.”). 
 67. See Walter G. Paefgen, Kollisionsrechtlicher Verbraucherschutz im 
Internationalen Vertragsrecht und europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 2003 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT [ZEUP] 266 (F.R.G.); Peter von Wilmowsky, Der internationale 
Verbrauchervertrag im EG-Binnenmarkt—Europarechtlicher Gestaltungsspielraum für 
kollisionsrechtlichen Verbraucherschutz, 1995 ZEUP 735. 
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search for the closest connection, but on EU policy considerations.68  
The possibility of basing a claim for unfair competition on one single 
law even if several countries are affected69 helps in the establishment of 
a common market, as opposed to local national markets.  Actually, 
every rule in the EU regulations becomes an instrument of EU policy, 
even when it merely copies existing rules of domestic choice of law.  
European Union choice-of-law rules become instruments of 
substantive Union policies.70 
 This is one reason why Richard Fentiman, taking a position of an 
English common lawyer and a European, views European develop-
ments in a far more dramatic light.71  He points out that English conflict 
of laws is more different from U.S. law than one may think, but that it 
also differs, traditionally, from continental European approaches.  One 
point for him concerns the technique of Rome I and Rome II, which he 
considers “simplistic and unevolved.”  Moreover, he points out that 
differences over more radical proposals, as discussed by the other 
authors, were not resolved in favor of a traditional approach, but rather 
have been concealed.  The emerging model for him is a regulatory and 
social one, with an administrative view for the judge, quite unlike the 
market and economic model, with an adjudicatory view for the judge as 
favored by English law.  Fentiman expresses fear that the European 
Court of Justice will favor predictability and uniformity over flexibility 
and respect for national traditions. 
B. Constitutionalization 
 Although federalization of choice of law is more important than 
is often thought, it alone does not represent a revolution.  A further 
important element is the (quasi-) constitutionalization of European 
choice of law.72 
 To speak of constitutionalization in the European context may 
appear odd. Europe has no real constitution.  The Constitutional Treaty 
failed after unsuccessful referenda in France and the Netherlands;73 as 
a response, the European Union agreed, more modestly, on a “Reform 
                                                 
 68. de Vareilles-Sommières, supra note 54, at 202. 
 69. Rome II, supra note 43, art. 6(3)(b). 
 70. Basedow, supra note 62; Meeusen, supra note 1. 
 71. Fentiman, supra note 43. 
 72. Lucia Serena Rossi, L’incidenza dei principi del diritto comunitario sul diritto 
internazionale privato:  dalla “comunitarizzazione” alla “constitutionalizzazione,” 40 RIV. DIR. 
INT. PRIV. PROC. 63 (2004). 
 73. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1. 
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Treaty,” the so-called Lisbon Treaty.74  Likewise, the argument that 
Europe has a quasi-federalist structure faces strong opposition.  But 
this argument would be too formalistic.  Functionally, the EC Treaty 
operates as a constitution and its impact on choice-of-law rules is 
structurally similar to that of other nations’ constitutions on domestic 
choice-of-law rules. 
 Constitutionalization is the main topic in Jürgen Basedow’s 
contribution to this issue.75  Though the political structure of the United 
States and the European Union are different, Basedow argues that a 
cautious comparison is possible since both are structured in a 
constitutional framework.76  Generally, federalization assumes that the 
federal body will act as a referee in conflicts arising between 
jurisdictions.  Basedow finds that U.S. federal law, including the U.S. 
Constitution, has almost no influence on choice of law in the United 
States.77  By contrast, the European Court of Justice has actively shaped 
conflict of laws through its case law on the free movement of goods and 
services, the freedom of establishment for corporations, and basic 
rights.  Basedow also summarizes the recent EU legislation in choice of 
law.78  Whereas U.S. federal bodies previously have been reluctant to 
intervene in state conflicts law, the European Court of Justice’s 
approach could be adopted by the United States Supreme Court to 
unify U.S. choice of law.  Though the Supreme Court has proven 
reluctant to apply balancing tests generally, a balance of collective 
interests against those of a single state may be manageable. 
 One important aspect of constitutionalization is the quasi-federal 
structure of the European Union and how this structure affects the 
relationship between its member states and their laws.  The other 
aspect concerns nondiscrimination, EU citizenship, and human rights.  
These developments overcome both the national and the private 
character of classical choice of law. 
1. Mutual Recognition and the Country-of-Origin Principle 
 The goal of the European Community, the establishment of an 
internal market, has often required interference with the application of 
domestic law.  To achieve this goal, the European Court of Justice has 
addressed issues that resemble conflict-of-laws problems.  For 
                                                 
 74. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. 
 75. Jürgen Basedow, Federal Choice of Law in Europe and the USA—A 
Comparative Account of Interstate Conflicts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2119 (2008). 
 76. Id. at 2122-24. 
 77. Id. at 2124-28. 
 78. Id. at 2141-45. 
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example, in its Cassis de Dijon decision of 1979, the Court held that 
member states were entitled to mutual recognition of their laws 
regarding standards of production,79 a principle that was later extended 
to the free movement of services.80  This principle effectively asserts a 
constitutional duty to recognize foreign law, especially (though not 
exclusively) that of the country of origin.  The approach was refined in 
Keck v. Mithouard, which restricted the duty of mutual recognition to 
national rules concerning product requirements and allowed the 
destination state to apply its own requirements concerning selling 
arrangements.81  From a conflicts perspective, this introduced both a 
subtle dépeçage and a difficult characterization issue. 
 Nonetheless, an impact on choice of law was long ignored, no 
doubt based on the perception that the European Community deals 
with public laws, while choice of law is a matter of private law.  Only 
since the early 1990s have scholars addressed the relationship between 
European Union law and choice of law with increasing intensity and 
sophistication.82  At about the same time, interest grew in the 
regulatory aspects and the economic analysis of choice of law.83  The 
Court of Justice enriched the debate with its decisions regarding the 
impact of the mutual recognition principle on the law of corporations.84  
                                                 
 79. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein 
(Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649.  The Commission now plans to codify the Cassis de 
Dijon jurisprudence (though explicitly only for “administrative decision,” not for private law).  
See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down 
Procedures Relating to the Application of Certain National Technical Rules to Products 
Lawfully Marketed in Another Member State and Repealing Decision 3052/95/EC, COM 
(2007) 36 final (Feb. 14, 2007). 
 80. Case C-76/90, Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co., 1991 E.C.R. I-4221, I-4243. 
 81. Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, Keck & Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6097. 
 82. It has become impossible to give a comprehensive overview.  For an extensive 
bibliography, see KEGEL & SCHURIG, supra note 27, at 211-18.  Jayme & Kohler provide 
annual reports.  See, e.g., Erik Jayme & Christian Kohler, Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2007:  
Windstille im Erntefeld der Integration, 27 IPRAX 493 (2007).  Notable recent collections 
include LES CONFLITS DE LOIS ET LE SYSTÈME JURIDIQUE COMMUNAUTAIRE, supra note 42, and 
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATE E DIRITTO COMUNITARIO (Paolo Picone ed., 2004). 
 83. For the scholarly discussion, see generally Horatia Muir Watt, Aspects 
économiques du droit international privé, in 307 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 
RECUEIL DES COURS:  COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
25 (2004); AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jürgen Basedow & 
Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2006); Giesela Rühl, Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law:  An 
Economic Perspective, 24 BERK. J. INT’L L. 801 (2006); Giesela Rühl, Party Autonomy in the 
Private International Law of Contracts:  Transatlantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency, 
in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 153 (Eckart Gottschalk, Ralf Michaels, 
Giesela Rühl & Jan von Hein eds., 2007). 
 84. Case C-411/03, SEVIC Sys. AG, 2005 E.C.R. I-10,805; Case C-167/01, Kamer 
van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-10,155; 
Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 2002 
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Many European countries used to subject corporations to the law of 
their principal place of business.  The European Court of Justice has 
subsequently limited the application of such a choice-of-law rule (even 
though the Court did not explicitly address choice of law). 
 Instead of rehashing this now well-known story, authors in this Issue 
take the next step and ask what follows.  Onnig Dombalagian shows 
how this jurisprudence moves European choice of law closer to the 
internal affairs rule in the United States (which, as he reminds us, has 
remained largely uninfluenced by the conflicts revolution).85  Yet he also 
emphasizes the limited impact of the internal affairs rule on capital 
markets regulation more generally. Current United States-European 
Union trade is problematic where the two capital market regimes differ.  
Specifically, the United States and the European Union differ as to 
disclosure requirements, insider trading regulations, the role of 
independent auditors and directors, and the appropriate conduct of 
takeover transactions.  However, Dombalagian notes, conflict of laws 
for capital markets is characterized by extraterritoriality, bilateral 
initiatives and reciprocal recognition, and issuer choice.  He criticizes 
these ex post approaches, however, and proposes in their stead an ex 
ante choice-of-law regime to govern globally regulated stock exchanges, 
providing, in particular, that these transactions be governed by the law 
of the state in which security is listed on a stock exchange. 
 Jens Dammann focuses on the impact of the European Court of 
Justice’s case law on in personam jurisdiction.86  He shows why third 
parties should not, as currently allowed in both the United States and 
Europe, be able to sue a corporation at its place of incorporation, even 
though the law of that place governs the corporation’s internal affairs.  
In suggesting two paths to reform—one on the level of member state 
corporate law and the other on the level of EU rules on jurisdiction—he 
shows the close interconnections between choice of law and substantive 
law and between EU law and member states’ law in Europe. 
 Finally, Larry Catá Backer addresses choice of law in a broader 
sense.87  The European Court of Justice has rendered several decisions 
restricting member states’ ability to hold so-called “golden shares”—
                                                                                                             
E.C.R.. I-9919; Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Ehvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-
1459.  For a discussion of this case law, see Benjamin Angelette, Note, The Revolution that 
Never Came and the Revolution Coming—De Lasteyrie du Salliant, Marks & Spencer, 
SEVIC Systems and the Changing Corporate Law in Europe, 92 VA. L. REV. 1189 (2006). 
 85. Onnig H. Dombalagian, Choice of Law and Capital Markets Regulation, 82 TUL. 
L. REV. 1903 (2008). 
 86. Jens Dammann, Adjudicative Jurisdiction and the Market for Corporate Charters, 
82 TUL. L. REV. 1869 (2008). 
 87. Larry Catá Backer, The Private Law of Public Law:  Public Authority as 
Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Public Law Element in 
Private Choice of Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1801 (2008). 
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shares that give the states that hold them rights going far beyond their 
nominal value.  Backer suggests reading these decisions as choice-of-
law decisions that pick among various bodies of rules—private law 
rules governing shareholder rights, public law rules regarding state 
control over corporations, and finally rules of European law. 
 The influence of European Union law goes beyond the Court of 
Justice and beyond corporate law.  Another development concerns 
legislation and the establishment of a country-of-origin principle, 
under which providers need comply only with the rules of their 
country of origin, as provided for in the amended TV Without Borders 
Directive and the E-Commerce Directive of 2000.88  The attempt to 
establish a country-of-origin principle in the Services Directive 
failed;89 the final version contains a vaguer (though not automatically 
less intrusive) duty to “respect the right of providers to provide 
services in a Member State other than that in which they are 
established.”90 
 There have been long debates over whether the country-of-origin 
principle must be understood as a choice-of-law principle.91  The 
question is not resolved simply because the E-Commerce Directive, in 
article 1(4), explicitly disavows any change of rules on conflict of 
laws.92  A response is possible only against the background of a 
broader understanding of choice of law, which shows the paradigm 
shift:  the country-of-origin principle is a choice-of-law principle, 
albeit not one according to classical conflict of laws but a new form of 
vested-rights principle.93  Within its scope, the principle determines 
                                                 
 88. Council Directive 89/552, On the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down 
by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of 
Television Broadcasting Activities, arts. 2, 2a 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23, amended by Directive 
97/36, 1997 O.J. (L 202) 60; Directive 2000/31, On Certain Legal Aspects of Information 
Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (“Directive on 
Electronic Commerce”), art. 3, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 9-10 [hereinafter Directive on Electronic 
Commerce]. 
 89. Michaels, supra note 13, at 195-96. 
 90. Directive 2006/123, On Services in the Internal Market, art. 16, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 
36, 58-59; see Achim Kampf, EU-Dienstleistungsrichtlinie und Kollisionsrecht, 28 IPRAX 
101, 102-03 (2008). 
 91. For discussion of the different viewpoints and further references, see Michaels, 
supra note 13. 
 92. Directive on Electronic Commerce, supra note 88, art. 1(4) (“This Directive does 
not establish additional rules on private international law nor does it deal with the jurisdiction 
of Courts.”). 
 93. See generally Michaels, supra note 13 (discussing the similarities between the 
two approaches).  For a similar discussion, see Wulf-Henning Roth, Methoden der 
Rechtsfindung und Rechtsanwendung im Europäischen Kollisionsrecht, 25 IPRAX 338, 343 
(2006). 
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that by complying with the rules of his country of origin, a provider 
acquires a privilege of which the country of destination may not 
deprive him by application of its own laws. 
 The discussion about a country-of-origin principle is related to a 
broader debate regarding the impact of a principle of mutual recogni-
tion on choice of law.  Taken to the extreme, the mutual recognition 
principle (like before the comparable institute of comity for Joseph 
Story) would make it possible to develop an entire system of choice-
of-law rules based on the Keck formula and its allocation of legislative 
jurisdiction between the country of origin and the country of 
destination.  Traditional choice of law would be replaced entirely by a 
constitutionalized system of mutual recognition.  This would raise 
problems not only of substance (because outcomes might change), but 
especially of method.94  In traditional European conflict of laws, 
recognition is reserved to foreign judgments; foreign law is not 
recognized, but applied.  Once the concept of recognition is extended 
to foreign law, choice of law moves closer to the recognition of foreign 
judgments. 
 The principle of mutual recognition can play an especially important 
role for same-sex partnerships, the theme of Katharina Boele-Woelki’s 
contribution.95  She begins by demonstrating the lack of uniformity 
among EU member states in the treatment of same-sex couples:  while 
some member states recognize same-sex marriages, others recognize 
registered partnerships or civil pacts, and others none at all.  In addition, 
current domestic laws do not clearly indicate whether same-sex 
relationships solemnized in the couple’s home country will be 
recognized abroad.  Though the free movement of persons principle in 
the European Convention on Human Rights could be interpreted to 
require member states to recognize same-sex relationships solemnized 
                                                 
 94. See Roberto Baratta, Problematic Elements of an Implicit Rule Providing for 
Mutual Recognition of Personal and Family Status in the EC, 27 IPRAX 4, 9-11 (2006); 
Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, Anerkennung im internationalen Personen-, Familien- und Erbrecht 
und das Europäische Kollisionsrecht, 25 IPRAX 392, 392-400 (2006); Marc Fallon & Johan 
Meeusen, Private International Law in the European Union and the Exception of Mutual 
Recognition, 2002 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 37, 45-46; Paul Lagarde, Développements futurs du 
droit international privé dans une Europe en voie d’unification:  quelques conjectures, 68 
RABELSZ 225, 235-38 (2004); Heinz-Peter Mansel, Anerkennung als Grundprinzip des 
Europäischen Rechtsraums, Zur Herausbildung eines europäischen Anerkennungs-
Kollisionsrechts:  Anerkennung statt Verweisung als neues Strukturprinzip des Europäischen 
internationalen Privatrechts?, 70 RABELSZ 651, 651-731 (2006).  Contra Tito Ballarino & 
Benedetta Ubertazzi, On Avello and Other Judgments:  A New Departure in the Conflict of 
Laws?, 2004 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 85, 127 (noting a parallel with Savigny). 
 95. Katharina Boele-Woelki, The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships 
Within the European Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1949 (2008). 
 
 
 
 
1630 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1607 
 
in other member states, current law has not yet developed in this 
direction.  The European experience should teach U.S. lawmakers that 
legislation on same-sex relationships must address the mobility of 
persons in the United States and abroad through the inclusion of private 
international law considerations in substantive regulation, with the end 
goal of contributing to the universal recognition of same-sex 
relationships.  However, the ultimate goal must lie in substantive law 
unification. 
 Mutual recognition is a theme also for Linda Silberman, who 
compares EU and U.S. approaches to marriage, divorce, custody, and 
support.96  In her view, European rules that take significant connections 
into account in determining the law applicable to marriage provide a 
helpful model for American attempts to distinguish “evasion” from 
“mobile” marriages, especially same-sex marriages. Regarding divorce, 
she finds that choice-of-law rules hardly play a role in the United States 
compared to rules on jurisdiction; although the new European regime 
distinguishes between these, she predicts no much greater role for 
choice-of-law rules there.  Silberman then discusses international 
conventions on  custody and support and thus addresses the global 
framework within which Americans and Europeans interact and within 
which comparison takes place. 
 Finally, Horatia Muir Watt discusses the new emphasis on 
recognition, especially in the area of family law and civil status, from a 
methodological and even philosophical perspective.97 The move away 
from bilateral choice-of-law rules toward a unilateral system of 
recognition is, for her, in accordance with recognition of identity.  
However, she strongly opposes basing this method on the principle of 
nondiscrimination, which for her is a “nonstarter” in choice of law. 
Instead, a choice-of-law system based on recognition expresses a 
respect for identity and difference:  the status acquired under foreign 
law must be recognized not because it is in some way similar to that of 
forum law, but because its intrinsic difference is constitutive of identity. 
 In many ways, the tendency towards constitutionalization is 
reminiscent of the United States experience in the first half of the 
twentieth century.98  Once the country-of-origin principle is recognized 
                                                 
 96. Linda J. Silberman, Rethinking Rules of Conflict of Laws in Marriage and 
Divorce in the United States: What Can We Learn from Europe?, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1999 
(2008) 
 97. Horatia Muir Watt, European  Federalism and the “New Unilateralism,” 82 TUL. 
L. REV. 1983 (2008). 
 98. For comparisons demonstrating the similar developments, see generally Pedro A. 
de Miguel Asensio, Conflictos de leyes e integración jurídica:  Estados Unidos y la Unión 
Europea, 5 ANUARIO ESPAÑOL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 43-102 (2005); Horatia 
Muir Watt, Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets:  A Matter of Political 
Economy, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 383 (2003); Holger Spamann, Choice of Law in a Federal 
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as a constitutionalized vested-rights theory, parallels ensue not only to 
the First Restatement but also to case law by the Supreme Court in the 
early twentieth century, when vested rights were protected under the 
Due Process Clause of the Constitution.99  Thus, the vested-rights 
theory was all but constitutionalized. 
 A further parallel, well known from the area of recognition of 
judgments100 but widely ignored in choice of law,101 exists between the 
principle of mutual recognition and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of 
the Constitution.  Shortly after its case law regarding the Due Process 
Clause, the Supreme Court began to apply the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause for choice of law as a duty to recognize foreign law—first as a 
strict duty to apply foreign law, and later as a duty to balance the 
regulatory interests of the various states.102  This duty strongly 
resembles the duty of mutual recognition from Cassis de Dijon, and 
the development from a duty of application to one of balancing 
resembles the jurisprudential development in Europe. 
 Finally, the unclear distinction between a country-of-origin 
principle and a principle of mutual recognition finds its parallel in a 
trilogy of Supreme Court cases in the 1980s, in which the Court 
combined its Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clause tests into 
one uniform test.103 
 And yet, the same trilogy of cases stands for an important 
difference between the United States and Europe.  The Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
System and an Internal Market (Jean Monnet Program, Working Paper No. 8/01, 2001), 
available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/012601.rtf. 
 99. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1930); Mut. Life Ins. Co. of 
N.Y. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209, 213-14 (1922); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 373-
74 (1918); EDWIN SCOTT FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW FOR AMERICAN COURTS:  A 
MULTILATERALIST METHOD 12-14 (2001); John K. Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of 
Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656, 656-57 & n.5 (1918); P.E. Herzog, Constitutional Limits on 
Choice of Law, in 234 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS:  COLLECTED 
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 234, 239, 260-66 (1992); G.W.C. 
Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?, 15 MINN. L. REV. 
161, 165 (1931). 
 100. E.g., Georg Haibach, The Mutual Recognition of Decisions in Civil and 
Commercial Matters in the European Union in the Light of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution, 10 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 291, 291-300 (2003). 
 101. But see Horatia Muir Watt, Experiences from Europe:  Legal Diversity and the 
Internal Market, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 429, 438 (2004). 
 102. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 547-50 
(1935); Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indust. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 500-05 (1939); 
Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159-62 (1932), overruled in part by Crider 
v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965). 
 103. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730-34 (1988); Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-19 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 
(1981) (plurality opinion). 
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reduced constitutional control of state approaches to choice of law to 
an absolute minimum (with a possible exception for the law of 
corporations, which also has an exceptional role before the European 
Court of Justice).104  A recent decision states, “Without a rudder to steer 
us, we decline to embark on the constitutional course of balancing 
coordinate States’ competing sovereign interests to resolve conflicts of 
laws under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”105  The European Court of 
Justice, by contrast, seems either to need no rudder or is willing to 
build it on its own.  This is true even outside commercial law, as recent 
developments in the law of family names suggest.  This is an area of 
the law that may appear marginal to Americans, but in fact it 
epitomizes the cultural identities underlying the most pertinent 
European conflicts case.  In Garcia Avello, the Court decided that 
children with dual Belgian and Spanish citizenship are entitled to bear 
their last name according to Spanish law, even though the choice-of-
law rules of Belgium, where the children resided, designated Belgian 
law as the law applicable to Belgian citizens who are dual citizens of 
another country.106  In Grunkin-Paul, the question was whether a child 
born in Denmark to two German parents was entitled to have his name 
registered in Germany as a double name combining both parents’ 
names according to Danish law, even though the German law 
applicable under German choice-of-law rules rejects a double name 
under these circumstances.107  A referral by the German registry to the 
European Court of Justice was rejected for formal reasons;108 a new 
referral on essentially the same question has not yet been decided,109 
but the opinions by the Advocate General in both cases, which would 
permit double-name registration in Germany despite German law, may 
                                                 
 104. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93 (1987); Edgar v. 
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644-46 (1982).  More explicit (for obvious reasons) is case law 
from the Delaware Supreme Court.  See, e.g., VantagePoint Venture Partners 196 v. Examen, 
Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1115-18 (Del. 2005); McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 214-16 
(Del. 1987).  See generally Deborah A. DeMott Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate 
Internal Affairs, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 183-90 (1985). 
 105. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003). 
 106. Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello v. État Belge, 2003 E.C.R. I-11,613.  For a 
summary and analysis of the case, see Johan Verlinden, European Court of Justice, Judgment 
of October 2, 2003, Case C-148/02, Carlos Garcia Avello v. État Belge (the State of 
Belgium), 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 705 (2005). 
 107. Case C-96/04, Standesamt Stadt Niebüll (Grunkin-Paul), 2006 E.C.R. I-3561.  
The affair even made the news in the United States.  See Mary Jacoby, No Hyphens, Please:  
Germany Tells Parents To Keep Names Simple, WALL ST. J., Oct 12, 2005, at A1. 
 108. Grunkin Paul, 2006 E.C.R. para. 20. 
 109. See Case C-353/06, Grunkin v. Grunkin-Paul (Apr. 24, 2008) (opinion of AG 
Sharpston), available at http://curia.europa.eu. 
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give some guidance for how the Court will decide.110  It becomes clear 
how the basic freedoms impact classical conflict of laws even beyond 
traditionally market-relevant areas of the law. 
2. Nondiscrimination, EU Citizenship, and Human Rights 
 Two important provisions in both these cases are the principle of 
nondiscrimination and the new institution of EU citizenship.111  This 
alone does not sound revolutionary:  equal treatment is one of the 
oldest principles of conflict of laws, and citizenship is a traditional 
connecting factor.  Comparison with the United States, however, 
demonstrates the importance. 
 In the United States, the principle of equal protection, established 
in the Fourteenth Amendment,112 has had fairly limited impact on 
choice of law.  Domicile is one of the most important connecting 
factors; states’ preference for their own residents over the residents of 
other states is a cornerstone of interest analysis.  In Europe, similar 
arguments exist.113  Early on, scholars discussed whether use of 
nationality as a connecting factor was barred by EU law.114  Yet 
although the Court has applied the nondiscrimination principle in 
several civil procedure cases,115 it has not yet gone so far as to bar 
nationality as a connecting factor in choice of law.116  In fact, neither in 
Garcia Avello nor in Grunkin-Paul does the tension between 
nationality and habitual residence play any role.  In both cases, the 
children successfully avoided application of the law of both their 
nationality and their habitual residence.  In Grunkin-Paul, the relevant 
connecting factor for the Advocate General was the child’s Danish 
                                                 
 110. Grunkin Paul, 2006 E.C.R. I-3561 (opinion of AG Jacobs); Case C-353/06, 
Grunkin (opinion of AG Sharpston), available at http://curia.europa.eu. 
 111. EC Treaty arts. 12, 17-18. 
 112. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 113. VON BAR & MANKOWSKI, supra note 25, § 3 no. 41. 
 114. SAVATIER, supra note 34; Ulrich Drobnig, Verstößt das Staatsangehörig-
keitsprinzip gegen das Diskriminierungsverbot des EWG-Vertrages?, 34 RABELSZ 636, 636-
62 (1970).  For further references, see KROPHOLLER, supra note 25, at 277. 
 115. See, e.g., Case C-323/95, Hayes v. Kronenberger GmbH, 1997 E.C.R. I-1711, I-
1724; Case C-122/96, Saldanha v. Hiross Holding AG, 1997 E.C.R. I-5325, I-5342; Case C-
43/95, Data Delecta Aktiebolag v. MSL Dynamics Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I-4661, I-4676; Case C-
398/92, Mund v. Hatrex Int’l Transport, 1994 E.C.R. I-467, I-481 to 82; Case C-20/92, 
Hubbard v. Hamburger, 1993 E.C.R. I-3777, I-3793 to 94; Case 22/80, Boussac Saint-Frères 
SA v. Gerstenmeier, 1980 E.C.R. 3427, 3436. 
 116. See Case C-430/97, Johannes v. Johannes, E.C.R. I-3475; Michael Bogdan, The 
EC Treaty and the Use of Nationality and Habitual Residence as Connecting Factors in 
International Family Law, in INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 303, 
308-15 (Johan Meeusen et al. eds., 2007). 
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birth certificate.117  And in Garcia Avello, the Court invoked the 
children’s Spanish nationality over their Belgian residence and 
nationality:  “It is not permissible for a Member State to restrict the 
effects of the grant of the nationality of another Member State by 
imposing an additional condition for recognition of that nationality 
with a view to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms provided for 
in the Treaty.”118  It follows that the question of whether nationality as a 
connecting factor accords with EU law or whether it must be replaced 
by habitual residence is not broad enough.  Garcia Avello can perhaps 
be implemented by granting dual nationals free choice of the 
applicable law;119 whether the result in Grunkin Paul can sensibly be 
translated into classical choice of law appears doubtful.  The decisions 
can be understood only from a principle of mutual recognition. 
 Something else is relevant.  The basis for the nondiscrimination 
principle is neither nationality nor habitual residence, but EU 
citizenship.120  The children are protected not as individuals or as 
nationals of a member state but as EU citizens.  This results in another 
obvious parallel with the United States, where the Fourteenth 
Amendment commands that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States.”121  Yet the Privileges and Immunities Clause has never 
played a great role for choice of law, occasional scholarly suggestions 
notwithstanding.122  In Europe, things look different:  EU citizenship 
superimposes in an important way the traditional importance of the 
nation. 
 Finally, a third new factor in European choice of law is 
fundamental rights.  Fundamental (or human) rights are sometimes 
viewed as the basis of classical conflict of laws;123 that they can 
                                                 
 117. Case C-96/04, Standesamt Stadt Niebüll (Grunkin Paul), 2006 E.C.R. I-3561 
(opinion of AG Jacobs); Case C-353/06, Grunkin v. Grunkin-Paul (opinion of AG Sharpston), 
paras. 67-70, available at http://curia.europa.eu. 
 118. Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello v. État Belge, 2003 E.C.R. I-11,613, I-11,645 to 
46. 
 119. Mansel, supra note 94, at 692, 694-96. 
 120. EC Treaty art. 18.  For an overview, see Flora Goudappel & Silvia Romein, 
Evolving Legal Personality:  The Case of European Union Citizenship, 11 IUS GENTIUM 1 
(2005); Jo Shaw, E.U. Citizenship and Political Rights in an Evolving European Union, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2549 (2007). 
 121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
 122. See BRAINERD CURRIE, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws:  
Privileges and Immunities, in CURRIE, supra note 10, at 445, 445-525; Douglas Laycock, 
Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States:  The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of 
Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 274-88 (1992). 
 123. See sources cited in Michaels, supra note 20, at 131-33. 
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influence choice of law, especially within the public policy exception, 
is not new, either.124  However, when the Advocate General based his 
opinion in Grunkin-Paul in part on the right to private and family life 
in article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which, 
according to the European Court of Human Rights, includes the right 
to one’s name,125 this suggests a considerable expansion of their 
importance, with far-reaching consequences,126 up to the possibility 
that choice of law itself becomes an instrument for human rights.127 
C. Pluralization of Method 
 If these developments lead to a paradigm shift, as is claimed here, 
the new paradigm still needs to be formulated.128  However, two 
important developments can be discovered.  One replaces the 
international focus of choice of law, the other one the role of the 
closest connection. 
1. Internal and External Conflicts 
 Classical European conflict of laws is international in focus and 
makes no difference between different countries.  Prima facie, this is 
true also for European choice of law:  Rome I and Rome II 
Regulations also apply vis-à-vis third countries—despite doubts about 
European Union competence for relations with third countries.  
Although conflicts scholars hope to maintain this international focus as 
much as possible,129 it was predicted early on that the similar treatment 
of all countries’ laws could not be maintained.130  This is now proving 
true.  Europeanization of choice of law distinguishes importantly 
between intra-Community conflicts and conflicts with third countries. 
                                                 
 124. KROPHOLLER, supra note 25, at 249-50. 
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 As between member states, European private law becomes even 
more “bilateral” than before, because the principle of mutual 
recognition widely bars preference of the forum, as becomes clear 
from Garcia Avello.  This rules out submitting dual nationals not only 
to the law of the forum if it presents one of the nationalities but also to 
the “effective” nationality, which was not allowed a role in Garcia 
Avello.131  Party autonomy is no longer merely a tool to determine the 
applicable law but an instrument toward a competition among legal 
orders; choice of the applicable law is not only (perhaps) a right,132 but 
also an obligation to avoid losing protection from the basic freedoms.133  
Renvoi may be largely excluded between member states.134  Domestic 
public policy is restricted between member states;135 the importance of 
a European public policy has grown.136  The application of mandatory 
rules by third countries is bound by EU law.137  The duty to determine 
the content of foreign law and apply it properly is greater toward 
member states than toward third countries; the same is true for 
appealability of questions of foreign law.138  Circumvention of the 
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ordinarily applicable law is encouraged by the deliberately formal 
factors of the principles of mutual recognition and country-of-origin, 
as the Centros decision by the Court of Justice made clear.139 
 Of these developments, the most important one for Erin O’Hara and 
Larry Ribstein is the rising role of party autonomy.140  Their interest in 
developing a market for law leads them to develop five requirements 
for efficient choice-of-law regimes.  Applying this framework to the 
centralized top-down choice-of-law regime in Europe and the 
decentralized bottom-up regime in the United States, they find that both 
systems can learn from each other:  Americans can learn about 
constitutionalized and centralized choice of law, especially from 
European Court of Justice jurisprudence. Europeans can learn how the 
decentralized state of choice of law in the United States may actually 
favor a market for laws. 
 In relation to third countries, by contrast (where the European 
Union adopts the former role of its member states through its 
membership in the Hague Conference), the trend goes toward 
unilateral preference for European law.  Thus, favoring of member 
state citizenship is not only still allowed:  EU citizenship will likely 
restrict even more the scope of the law of third countries for dual 
nationals.  Public policy and European mandatory rules have become 
more important, too.  A striking example can be found in the European 
Court of Justice’s Ingmar decision of 2000.141  The Court had to decide 
whether a commercial agent operating within the European Union was 
protected by certain provisions of the 1985 European directive on 
commercial agents, even though the agent was working for a 
Californian principal and had signed a contract stipulating that 
California law governed their relationship.142  Given that the directive 
was largely modeled on German and French law, it would have 
followed to adopt decisions by these countries’ highest courts and to 
characterize such protection as not immune against party choice of 
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law.143  However, the European Court of Justice did not hesitate to 
enforce the directive over the parties’ choice of law144 and thus gave 
greater weight to the regulatory interests of the European Union than 
classical choice of law did for states’ regulatory interests.  The Court’s 
justification was that this protection was necessary to achieve equal 
market conditions in the European marketplace,145 thereby 
demonstrating the difference with internal conflicts:  If member states 
use this argument to justify application of their own law over that of 
the country of origin, it regularly fails.  The use of regulatory interests 
to determine the territorial scope and mandatory character of EU 
choice of law resembles, in its method and in its results, the Supreme 
Court jurisprudence regarding the scope and binding force of federal 
statutory law.  This suggests, at least in relations with third countries, 
an Americanization of European choice of law.146 
2. From Method of Conflicts to Conflict of Methods 
 In the United States, the demise of the vested-rights theory led to 
two kinds of new methods.  One set of proposals suggested a new 
uniform focus, for example on governmental interests, which made 
them better adapted for some problems than others.  Other methods 
collected a number of relevant factors with unclear relations among 
themselves. 
 This is the focus of Bill Reppy’s article for this issue.147  Reppy 
distinguishes three theories of choice of law:  territorialism, personal 
law, and interest analysis.  These methods can be combined in various 
ways, and Reppy tries to show how harmful such combinations can be.  
He distinguishes between three kinds of eclecticism.  The first is 
second-look eclecticism, where courts apply primarily one method but 
will apply another method if the first method is inconclusive.  A second 
type is dépeçage eclecticism, where different parts of one area of the 
law are resolved by different methods.  The third, and for Reppy the 
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most despised, is big-mix eclecticism, where courts are unable to say 
both what goes into the mix and how the methods relate to each other.  
Finding examples of these three kinds of combinations in both 
European and American choice of law, Reppy provides a critique of 
both regimes. 
 In Europe, it looks as though a new choice of law is emerging as 
the combination of two methods.  The first of these methods largely 
resembles classical choice of law, moderated, however, in the way 
discussed through federalization.  This method is supplemented by a 
second method grounded in EU law.  That second method looks 
neither to balances between regulatory interests of states, nor to the 
closest connection.148  Instead, it regulates the conflict between states’ 
regulatory interest on the one hand, and private rights on the other 
hand, as protected (indirectly) through the four freedoms. 
 Two recent decisions by the European Court of Justice may 
illustrate this combination.  In the Viking case, Finnish employees had 
attempted to prevent the reflagging of a shipping company from 
Finland to Estonia.149  The Laval case raised the question of whether 
Swedish unions could take collective action to enforce a Swedish 
collective agreement against a Latvian company posting Latvian 
workers to building sites in Sweden.150  From a classical choice-of-law 
perspective, the relations between employer and employees would 
likely be governed by Swedish or Finnish law respectively, because 
article 8(1) of Rome I determines that the protective provisions of the 
law of the country in which the employee habitually carries out his 
work in performance of the contract remain applicable.  If, in the Laval 
case, the employees are only temporarily employed in Sweden, then 
Latvian law applies to them pursuant to article 8(2).  With regard to the 
unions, the law applicable to injuries from industrial action under 
article 9 of Rome II (which was inapplicable to these cases), would be 
“the law of the country where the action is to be, or has been, taken”; 
this is true also for preliminary injunctions.151  For the Court of Justice, 
however, such choice-of-law rules played no role.  Instead, the Court 
addressed the conflict as one between the unions exercising their social 
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rights under state law on the one hand, and the respective corporation 
exercising its right to free movement on the other.152 
 The coexistence of two fundamentally different choice-of-law 
methods has three important implications.  First, the EU method 
deviates deliberately from the closest connection, so a conflict of 
methods is often unavoidable.153  For example, the country of origin is 
not the law of the marketplace (which will often have the closest 
connection);154 its law is applied precisely in order to break open the 
monopolistic position of the law of the market, if that law’s application 
stifles competition.  The Centros decision, requiring Denmark to apply 
English law to a company that was Danish in almost all respects except 
that it was registered in England, illustrates a similar point.  The 
decision was not based on the idea that connections to England were 
closer than to Denmark, but rather on the desire to enable parties to 
escape the restrictions of the law of the closest connection.  Because 
the traditional method and the new European law have conflicting 
goals, it will hardly be sufficient merely to translate the EU method 
into new connecting factors under the traditional paradigm.155 
 A second important consequence ensues.  The conflict within the 
EU method between private rights and state regulation can be decided 
entirely by EU law, in particular the provisions and case law on the 
four freedoms and the goals of the European Union, without a need to 
resort to traditional choice of law.  This is obvious in the Laval and 
Viking decisions, which were decided in one case for the employees, 
in the other for the employer. 
 This means, thirdly, that the method of conflicts in Europe has 
now turned into a conflict of methods.  It is no longer sufficient to 
resolve conflicts of law on the basis of one method that is, in and by 
itself, more or less coherent.  Often, the traditional method would yield 
a result different from that ensuing from application of EU 
constitutional law.  The decision to be made is then which method 
trumps the other, with regard to the specific case before the judge.  In 
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the United States, it is clear that the Constitution merely sets outer 
limits and does not specify a choice-of-law method the states must 
follow.  The same was true in Europe for a long time.  Now that choice 
of law itself has become an EU instrument, this conflict of methods 
occurs within Community law.  It seems likely that the conflict will 
frequently be resolved to the detriment of classical choice of law. 
 One example is the Rüffert case recently decided by European 
Court of Justice.156  The question in this case was whether German 
procurement law could require a Polish bidder to commit to paying 
wages according to German law to its Polish employees.157  Under 
article 8(2) of Rome I, the employment contract would be governed by 
Polish law if the employees were only temporarily employed in 
Germany; mandatory rules of German law might also be applicable 
under article 9.  Though the Advocate General began his analysis with 
these provisions (more exactly, the parallel provisions of the Rome 
Convention), he ended up using them merely to trigger a discussion of 
specific EU provisions and considerations, in particular the Posting of 
Workers Directive.158  Article 9 of Rome I turns from an exception and 
opening clause into a mere entry gate for EU law.159  Whether the Court 
of Justice will give more weight to traditional choice of law when the 
Rome I Regulation becomes applicable to such cases appears doubtful. 
IV. EUROPEANIZATION AS REVOLUTION 
 These developments constitute a genuine revolution.  
Europeanized choice of law can hardly be accommodated with the 
three pillars of classical choice of law developed in the nineteenth 
century.  It represents a paradigm shift that is at least as fundamental as 
was the U.S. conflicts revolution.  European choice of law is no longer 
private, national, and domestic/international.  It is now European, 
regulatory, and mediatized. 
A. A Genuine Revolution 
 First, Europeanization replaces the privatized choice of law in the 
sense of Savigny with a regulatory choice-of-law regime.  Privatization 
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does not refer to the exclusion of public interests but to the specific 
private law resolution of conflicts through reference on the basis of the 
closest connection; this approach now steps to the background.  This 
becomes clear in the principles of mutual recognition and country-of-
origin, which use recognition instead of reference, use formal criteria 
instead of the criterion of the closest connection, and draw European 
choice of law close to the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments.  The horizontal relation between two parties is supplanted 
by the vertical relation between actors in the internal market on one 
hand and regulating states on the other.  Even more importantly, the 
rules in the federalized choice-of-law regime of the Rome Regulations 
can no longer be understood as referring rules in the sense of Savigny.  
They are now distributive rules—European rules which redistribute 
legislative competence among the member states from a central 
position and on the basis of EU policies. 
 The national character of choice of law is replaced by a truly 
European choice-of-law regime.  For Mancini, choice of law found its 
political foundation in the individual’s membership in the nation; this 
was the ground for the nationality principle.160  If this nationality 
principle now loses its fundamental role for choice of law not to the 
(unpolitical) habitual residence but to supranational EU citizenship, 
membership in the European Union has implications far beyond 
determination of the law applicable to personal status.  The legal 
positions accruing to the individual via her EU citizenship—EU basic 
rights, fundamental freedoms, nondiscrimination—are not emanations 
of her link to a nation state (as were, for example, the fundamental 
rights of domestic constitutions).  Instead they limit these links:  the 
individual can appeal to the European Union against the rules of her 
own state.161 
 Finally, the domestic internationalism of choice of law is replaced 
by a mediatized choice of law.162  This is immediately apparent from its 
foundation, which is no longer national but supranational:  choice of 
law is now European law. Moreover, the focus of choice of law is now 
European as well.  Internally, conflicts of laws are resolved with a view 
to a uniform area of justice; externally, they serve essentially to protect 
and delimit the European Union.  If choice of law before was bilateral, 
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now its external side is (at least partly) unilateral; its internal side is 
regulatory. 
 In theory it is possible that these developments will in the long 
run merge into the classical paradigm.  This would require that the 
federalized choice-of-law regime remain oriented toward the closest 
connection, that the mutual recognition and country-of-origin 
principles be translated into classical referring choice-of-law rules, that 
the European Union in the long run replace the nation, and that 
European choice of law again become more bilateral.  This is not likely 
to happen.  It would presuppose that the European Union will not 
utilize the regulatory competence it has acquired, and there is little 
reason to think that. 
B. Comparison with the United States 
 This European revolution is at least as significant as the U.S. 
revolution.  As in the United States, the outcomes of many conflicts 
cases may be the same.  But the way in which Europeans think about 
choice of law will change fundamentally. 
 In one way, the European revolution is even more radical than the 
American one.  In the United States, the step away from the formalism 
of vested rights toward a choice-of-law approach that takes seriously 
the relevant regulatory interest was entwined with the idea that the 
coordination of these interests should occur on the federal level—
through federal legislation,163 the federal courts,164 or a greater role for 
the Constitution.  None of these steps occurred:  the Congress lacks 
incentives to enact legislation,165 and the Supreme Court essentially 
barred the federal courts from developing a meaningful choice-of-law 
regime166 and restricted the influence of the Constitution to a minimum 
in the trilogy of cases in the 1980s discussed earlier.167  In this 
important sense, the American conflicts revolution has remained 
incomplete. 
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 It goes without saying that the European developments cannot 
simply be transplanted to the United States.  Just as the American 
conflicts revolution was, so is the new European choice-of-law 
revolution ultimately contingent upon its own framework.  In the 
United States, federal legislation is generally suspect and unlikely to 
succeed in choice of law; the current emphasis on states rights 
probably makes federalization and constitutionalization impossible.  
Whether a model code would be more promising168 appears doubtful.  
But even short of a direct transplant, the European developments 
should be of interest to the United States.  Revolutionaries learn from 
one another, even if they aim for different goals.  If the comparison of 
U.S. and EU choice of law, long confined to the influence of United 
States on European choice of law, can become a true dialogue again,169 
the European conflicts revolution will have at least one undeniably 
positive consequence. 
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